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Abstract  5 
 6 
Over ninety-five percent of post-mortem samples from the 1918 pandemic, which caused 50 7 
to 100 million deaths, showed bacterial infection complications. The introduction of 8 
antibiotics in the 1940s has since reduced the risk of bacterial infections, but growing 9 
resistance to antibiotics could increase the toll from future influenza pandemics if secondary 10 
bacterial infections are as serious as in 1918, or even if they are less severe. We develop a 11 
valuation model of the option to withhold wide use of an antibiotic until significant outbreaks 12 
such as pandemic influenza or foodborne diseases are identified. Using real options theory, 13 
we derive conditions under which withholding wide use is beneficial and calculate the option 14 
value for influenza pandemic scenarios that lead to secondary infections with a resistant 15 
Staphylococcus aureus strain. We find that the value of withholding an effective novel oral 16 
antibiotic can be positive and significant unless the pandemic is mild and causes few 17 
secondary infections with the resistant strain or if most patients can be treated intravenously. 18 
Although the option value is sensitive to parameter uncertainty, our results suggest that 19 
further analysis on a case-by-case basis could guide investment in novel agents as well as 20 
strategies on how to use them. 21 
 22 
Key words: real options analysis; insurance value; antibiotics; antibiotics resistance; 23 
pandemic influenza; secondary bacterial infections  24 
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1. Introduction 26 
In the past four hundred years, roughly three influenza pandemics have spread across the 27 
world each century, killing millions of people (Potter, 2001). The most recent pandemic 28 
influenza prior to the introduction of antibiotics in 1942 was the 1918 (H1N1) pandemic, also 29 
known as the ‘Spanish Flu.’ It was the most devastating pandemic historically, infecting a 30 
third of the world’s population and killing 50 to 100 million people (Johnson & Mueller, 31 
2002). Postmortem samples showed that over ninety-five percent of deaths in the 1918 32 
pandemic were complicated by a bacterial infection (Morens, Taubenberger, & Fauci, 2008), 33 
and had antibiotics been available in 1918, many deaths could have been averted (Brundage, 34 
2006; Handel, Longini, & Antia, 2009; Chien, Levin, & Klugman, 2012). Since then, 35 
experience and science have taught us more about influenza viruses and pandemics (1957, 36 
1968, and 2009), and we have developed tools, such as better infection control, vaccines, 37 
antivirals, and antibiotics, to prepare for and combat future pandemics.  38 
 39 
Despite the significant research on previous pandemics undertaken in the 21st century, it is 40 
difficult to predict the timing and scale of the next pandemic. Influenza A viruses continually 41 
evolve through accumulated mutations over time (antigenic drift) and also by less frequent 42 
but more drastic antigenic changes that occur when different sub-types infect a single cell 43 
(antigenic shift). Pandemic influenza occurs when a novel influenza A sub-type emerges or 44 
an old one—not recently in cycle—remerges in an immunologically naïve human population 45 
(Webby & Webster, 2001). These changes are unpredictable, making future pandemics 46 
inevitable, and their timing and scale unknown (Webby & Webster, 2001; Taubenberger & 47 
Morens, 2010).  48 
 49 
The World Health Organization (WHO) and several countries have developed pandemic 50 
preparedness plans, which include maintaining stocks of antivirals, antibiotics, and vaccines 51 
to minimize the impact of future pandemics (e.g., US Department of Health and Human 52 
Services, 2005; Department of Health, 2011a; WHO, 2009). Supporting these plans, the 53 
breadth of literature on the value and cost-effectiveness of stockpiling vaccines and antivirals 54 
has increased in the 21st century (Velasco et al., 2012 and herin; Germann, Kadau, Longini, & 55 
Macken, 2006; Attema, Lugnér, & Feenstra, 2010; Halder, Kelso, & Milne, 2014). However, 56 
the economic value of stockpiling or conserving the effectiveness of antibiotics remains 57 
unexplored despite the high morbidity and mortality caused by secondary bacterial infections.  58 
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 59 
Maintaining a stockpile of antibiotics will not be an effective strategy for prepardness if the 60 
antibiotics are not effective. The emergence of multi-drug resistant and pandrug-resistant 61 
(PDR), untreatable infections and the alarm bells of a potential postantibiotic era emphasize 62 
the value of protecting our investment in effective antibiotics, whether existing or in the 63 
development pipeline (Souli, Galani, & Giamarellou, 2008; McGann et al., 2016; Chen, 64 
2017; Laxminarayan et al., 2013). In a world with prevalent PDR bacterial infections, 65 
treatment costs increase significantly, cuts and scrapes can be life-threatening, and common 66 
surgical procedures and cancer chemotherapy may lead to unacceptably high rates of 67 
untreatable infections (Teillant, Gandra, Barter, Morgan, & Laxminarayan, 2015; ECDC & 68 
EMEA, 2009). In the event of a significant influenza pandemic, secondary infections caused 69 
by prevalent PDR bacteria could be catastrophic. Ensuring effective antibiotics in the future 70 
is a public health priority, and only two novel classes of antibiotics have been introduced 71 
since the 1970s (Coates, Halls, & Hu, 2011).  72 
 73 
A possible strategy for managing a newly developed antibiotic is to withhold its wide use to 74 
conserve its effectiveness until a later time, when it potentially provides higher benefits. The 75 
benefits, or value, we garner in the future by this delay are the opportunity cost of foregoing 76 
the antibiotic’s use for a time. This value is pertinent to antibiotics because increasing their 77 
use today may improve the effectiveness of the existing portfolio of drugs available to treat 78 
infections, but with the irreversible cost of reduced effectiveness for treating an uncertain 79 
number of future infections. Antibiotic effectiveness decreases because their use leads to 80 
selection pressure for resistant microbial strains, giving these strains competitive advantage 81 
(Davies & Davies, 2010), and even if resistance is reversible by reducing consumption, the 82 
process would be slow, costly, and easily reversed (Andersson & Hughes, 2010).  83 
 84 
The literature on valuing new antibiotics provides a framework to estimate their expected net 85 
present value (NPV) (Sertkaya et al., 2014), but it fails to capture the irreversible effect of 86 
resistance and the value new antibiotics contribute to having effective treatment options in 87 
the future. Traditional NPV analysis assumes the decision to invest is a now-or-never one and 88 
does not consider delaying investing, or in our case introducing the wide use of an antibiotic. 89 
However, real options theory has studied the impact of irreversibility and uncertainty on the 90 
value of delaying investment and maintaining flexibility (Myers, 1977; McDonald & Siegel, 91 
1986; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). Real options valuation has roots in corporate 92 
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finance, but its application has extended to other fields, including a growing literature on real 93 
options analysis in healthcare investment and health technology assessment (e.g., Palmer & 94 
Smith, 2000; Driffield & Smith, 2007; Eckermann & Willan, 2008; Attema et al., 2010; 95 
Meyer & Rees, 2012; Wernz, Gehrke, & Ball, 2015; Thijssen & Bregantini, 2017). The real 96 
options framework has also been implemented and studied in the context of pest resistance 97 
(Wesseler, 2003; Mbah, Forster, Wesseler, & Gilligan, 2010) and assessing policy changes 98 
(Leitzel & Weisman, 1999; Beckmann, Soregaroli, & Wesseler, 2006; Wesseler & 99 
Zilberman, 2014).  100 
 101 
Studies on delaying access to treatment highlight additional values that underpin a real 102 
options framework for considering either immediately offering or delaying access to 103 
antibiotics (Littmann, Buyx, & Cars, 2015). Eckermann & Willan (2008) show that the 104 
option to delay introduction to collect additional evidence may be preferable to adopting 105 
health technologies when the decision is irreversible. Wesseler & Zilberman (2014) develop 106 
an option model to demonstrate how political economy can drive delaying introducing a 107 
Vitamin A deficiency reducing technology. Other authors have raised ethical issues related to 108 
delaying access to treatment, including intragenerational and intergenerational justice 109 
(Dawson & Verweij, 2007) and the trade-off between patient autonomy and drug control 110 
(Coleman, Jaramillo, Reis, & Selgelid, 2010). The common theme is that these studies assess 111 
trade-offs between immediate and delayed treatment.  112 
 113 
In this paper, we apply real options theory and develop a framework for assessing trade-offs 114 
to estimate the value of investing in developing and conserving an antibiotic to mitigate the 115 
burden of bacterial infections during pandemic influenza. A similar model can be applied to 116 
value the availability of effective antibiotics in other potential scenarios, such as regional 117 
outbreaks of PDR bacteria in healthcare settings that force shutting down intensive care units, 118 
outbreaks of foodborne resistant infections in the community, or simply when resistant 119 
bacteria are more prevalent in the community. We focus on pandemic influenza because 120 
several countries already maintain a stockpile in preparation, but these stockpiles will not be 121 
effective if the antibiotics are not effective. Furthermore, the high burden over a short period 122 
can stress the health system and other sectors of the economy. In the following section, we 123 
derive the theoretical solution and study threshold rules for when investing in an antibiotic 124 
and withholding its use until an outbreak is beneficial. We numerically estimate the value for 125 
scenarios of pandemic influenza in the United Kingdom (UK). 126 
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 127 
2. Model: option value of conserving antibiotics 128 
We assume the novel antibiotic is available at time t0 = 0, and its development cost is I. At 129 
time t1, which is uncertain, an outbreak of infections caused by PDR bacteria is identified. A 130 
decision maker, such as the UK Department of Health, needs to decide whether to widely 131 
introduce the antibiotic at t0 or withhold its wide use until t1, when the benefits may be 132 
higher. We model both policies’ NPVs, with costs and benefits related to the new antibiotic 133 
that accrue over time discounted at the annual rate . The difference between the policies’ 134 
NPVs represent the value of the option to conserve the antibiotic’s effectiveness until the 135 
outbreak is identified. We define this value as the ‘option value.’ Since the novel antibiotic is 136 
available at time t0 in both policies (i.e., investment in the antibiotic is not delayed in either 137 
policy), the investment cost I does not impact the option value of conserving effectiveness.  138 
 139 
2.1. Policy A: Withhold wide use of antibiotic 140 
Use of the novel antibiotic is held off until a significant outbreak is detected at an uncertain 141 
point in time, t1 (Figure 1). The model for Policy A calculates the value to invest in 142 
developing an antibiotic conserved until detecting the outbreak. 143 
 144 
 145 
Figure 1. Policy A.  146 
 147 
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The annual costs of stockpiling and storing the antibiotic (CS) are incurred starting at t0 = 0. 148 
The outbreak is expected to occur O  years after the antibiotic has been developed (i.e., at 149 
time t1 = O ). We model the uncertainty related to the start of the outbreak by letting O  150 
follow the exponential distribution   O OhO Og h e
  , with   1O OE h  , where Oh  denotes 151 
the hazard rate. The outbreak duration, L , is exponentially distributed with   L L
h
L Lk h e
   152 
and   1L LE h  , where Lh is the hazard rate. 153 
 154 
The stockpile maintenance and distribution costs during the outbreak are RC . The availability 155 
of the novel antibiotic during the outbreak leads to benefits ( PB ) that include the avoided 156 
economic costs that would have been incurred in the absence of the antibiotic. 157 
 158 
When the antibiotic is introduced, bacterial resistance to the drug emerges and spreads. We 159 
model the decrease in effectiveness of the novel antibiotic by discounting the treatment 160 
benefits at the annual rate of decay r . Thus, the effective annual benefits of the new antibiotic 161 
during the outbreak are  Or t
PB e
  , for 
O O Lt     . 162 
 163 
After the outbreak (i.e., after 2 O Lt    ), the antibiotic provides annual benefits of 164 
 Or t
APB e
  . The post-outbreak benefits represent the antibiotic increasing the effectiveness of 165 
the portfolio of antibiotics available to treat infections. At this point, we no longer withhold 166 
and stockpile the antibiotic. 167 
 168 
Using the functional forms for the distribution of uncertain times O  and L  specified above, 169 
we obtain the present value net benefits of Policy A as follows (Appendix A presents the 170 
derivations): 171 
 172 
Pre-outbreak costs of stockpiling and storing are 173 
 
S
O
C
h 
, (1)  
benefits – costs during the outbreak are 174 
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O P R
O L L
h B C
h r h h  
 
 
    
, (2)  
benefits after the outbreak are 175 
 
   
O L AP
O L
h h B
h r r h     
, (3)  
and the NPV of Policy A is 176 
 – I – (1) + (2) + (3). (4)  
 177 
2.2. Policy B: immediately introduce antibiotic 178 
The antibiotic is launched and is immediately part of the existing portfolio of antibiotics at 179 
0 0t   (Figure 2). 180 
 181 
Figure 2. Policy B. 182 
 183 
The annual costs of stockpiling and storing the novel antibiotic (CS) are incurred from 0 0t   184 
until the outbreak at 1t . The benefits from immediate release are a more diverse portfolio of 185 
antibiotics in the pre-outbreak period, which provides an annual benefit of rt
PPB e
 , for 186 
0 Ot   . 187 
 188 
After the outbreak is identified at 1 Ot   and until it is over at 2 O Lt    , costs for 189 
stockpile maintenance and distribution ( RC ) are accrued. The annual benefits of the novel 190 
antibiotic during the outbreak, rt
PB e
 , for 
O O Lt     , account for the decreasing 191 
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effectiveness due to resistance. The discounted annual benefits after the outbreak (i.e., after 192 
2 O Lt    ) are 
rt
APB e
 . 193 
 194 
The present value net benefits in each period of Policy B (derivations in Appendix A) are as 195 
follows: 196 
 197 
benefits – costs before the outbreak are 198 
 
SPP
O O
CB
r h h 

  
, (5)  
benefits – costs during the outbreak are 199 
 
     
O P O R
O L O L
h B h C
r h r h h h   

     
, (6)  
benefits after the outbreak are 200 
 
   
O L AP
O L
h h B
r r h r h      
, (7)  
and the NPV of Policy B is  201 
 – I + (5) + (6) + (7). (8)  
 202 
2.3. Option value 203 
The option value of conserving effectiveness is the difference between expressions (4) and 204 
(8). 205 
 206 
2.4. Parameters thresholds 207 
We now investigate the conditions under which the option value is positive and withholding 208 
immediate wide use of the antibiotic is beneficial. After simplifications, the condition 209 
A BNPV NPV  implies  210 
 
  
OPP
L O L
P AP
rhB
h h r h
B B
r
 


  


. 
(9)  
Note that the right-hand side of inequality (9) is always non-negative (as all parameters are 211 
non-negative) and less than unity. 212 
 213 
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To consider the ratio of potential pre-outbreak benefits to ones during the outbreak, we 214 
further assume benefits after the outbreak—and after the novel antibiotic has been introduced 215 
in both policies A and B—are negligible (i.e., 0APB  ). Inequality (9) then reduces to  216 
 
. 
(10)  
Letting 
  
O
O L
rh
m
h r h 

  
, we can interpret condition (10) as the maximum ratio of 217 
pre-outbreak to outbreak benefits ( PP
P
B
B
) for which withholding wide use of an antibiotic 218 
(Policy A) is more beneficial than using it immediately (Policy B). 219 
 220 
Because 0m r   , the maximum value of the threshold is when r  ,  producing 221 
. Similarly, because 0Om h   , when Oh  ,  then , Finally, 222 
since 0Lm h   , the maximum value of m is when 0Lh  , producing 223 
. 224 
 225 
Note that in the extreme cases, when 0r   or 0Oh  , inequality (10) reduces to 0
PP
P
B
B
 , 226 
which cannot hold because benefits are positive. Therefore, when 0r   or 0Oh  , 227 
A BNPV NPV . Intuitively, if no resistance to antibiotics builds up ( 0r  ), then we always 228 
choose to introduce the antibiotic immediately after its development. Similarly, if expected 229 
time to the outbreak approaches infinity ( 0Oh  ), we always choose immediate introduction.  230 
 231 
3. Application scenario details 232 
3.1. Influenza pandemic scenario 233 
We based our pandemic scenarios on the UK preparedness plan assumptions (Department of 234 
Health, 2007, 2011a) but made specific assumptions regarding prevalence of bacterial 235 
infections (see Table 1). In the base-case, we assumed that the influenza pandemic will lead 236 
to secondary bacterial infections in 20% of cases (Brundage, 2006; Morens et al., 2008), with 237 
  
OPP
P O L
rhB
B h r h 

  
O
O
h
m
h

 L
r
m
r h

 
  
O
O
rh
m
h r 

 
10 
 
10% of these infections caused by a resistant Staphylococcus aureus strain (Morens et al., 238 
2008; Oswald, Shooter, & Curwen, 1958; Louria, Blumenfeld, Ellis, Kilbourne, & Rogers, 239 
1959; Schwarzmann, Adler, Sullivan, & Marine, 1971). Though S. aureus represented only 240 
8% of bacterial pathogens in autopsies of the 1918 pandemic, it was predominant in the 1957 241 
pandemic potentially because resistance to tetracycline and streptomycin was becoming 242 
widespread (Morens et al., 2008; Department of Health, 2011b). We assumed the base-case 243 
scenario hazard rate ( Oh ) is 1/150 (see Appendix B). 244 
 245 
The prevalence of secondary bacterial infections in community and healthcare settings would 246 
stress the healthcare system. Available oral antibiotics may not effectively treat infections 247 
with the resistant S. aureus strain, and individuals infected with the strain would require 248 
hospitalization. Though we assumed intravenous (IV) therapy exists, the increased volume of 249 
cases would overburden the health system, leading to deaths and increased economic costs. 250 
Previous estimates suggested that hospital capacity may only meet 20% to 25% of expected 251 
demand at the pandemic peak (Department of Health, 2007), and exacerbating the situation, 252 
the risk of secondary bacterial infections may be greater in healthcare settings then in the 253 
community, particularly in the case of a pathogen such as resistant S. aureus, which is 254 
prevalent in this setting (Nin et al., 2011; European Centre for Disease Prevention and 255 
Control, 2017). We modelled three levels of IV therapy coverage: 20%, 50%, and 80%.  256 
 257 
Table 1 provides details on the base-case scenario and on more mild and severe scenarios; 258 
Appendix B describes the scenario parameter choices in more detail.  259 
 260 
Table 1. Pandemic influenza scenarios 261 
 
Base-
case 
Mild 
scenario 
Severe 
scenario 
Sensitivity 
distribution † 
Source for assumptions 
Pandemic influenza 
Pandemic hazard rate 
(
Oh ) 
1/150 3/100 1/500 
Lognormal 
(1/500, 1/100, 1/20) 
(Potter, 2001)  
Pandemic attack rate ‡ 35% 25% 50% 
Beta 
(15%, 30%, 50%) 
(Potter, 2001; Ferguson et 
al., 2006; Department of 
Health, 2007, 2011a) 
Pandemic duration  
(1 Oh ) 
15 weeks 15 weeks 15 weeks 
Lognormal 
(5, 15, 52 weeks)  
(Potter, 2001; 
Taubenberger & Morens, 
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2010; Department of 
Health, 2007, 2011a) 
Pandemic overall case 
fatality rate (CFR), 
including 
secondary bacterial 
infections  
1% 0.04% 2.5% 
Beta 
(0.02%, 0.5%, 2%) § 
(Department of Health, 
2007, 2011a; US 
Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2005) 
Secondary bacterial infections  
Percent develop 
secondary bacterial 
infections ‡ 
20% 10% 30% 
Beta 
(10%, 20%, 35%) 
(Brundage, 2006; Morens 
et al., 2008; Department 
of Health, 2007, 2011a) 
Percent of bacterial 
infections caused 
by S. aureus 
resistant to existing 
oral antibiotics ‡ 
10% 1.25% 20% 
Beta 
(0%, 2%, 20%) 
(Morens et al., 2008; 
Department of Health, 
2011b; Oswald et al., 
1958; Louria et al., 1959; 
Schwarzmann et al., 
1971) 
CFR for S. aureus 
secondary bacterial 
infections  
30% 20% 30% 
Beta 
(15%, 25%, 35%) 
(Department of Health, 
2011a; Oswald et al., 
1958) 
Proportion of 
secondary 
infections that can 
be treated 
intravenously ‡¶ 
20%, 
50%, and 
80% 
50% and 
80% 
20% and 
50% 
Lognormal 
(10, 40, 500 
thousand) 
Authors’ assumption 
† Distribution used in Latin-Hypercube Sampling Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient sensitivity analysis. Percentiles the 
distribution was fitted to are provided in parentheses: 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5%. 
‡ Used to estimate avertable cases and deaths by the novel antibiotic. 
§ Overall CFR only affects models that consider economic losses due to absenteeism from work, which is a function of the 
number of deaths. Additionally, the sensitivity range for overall CFR does not include deaths due to the infections caused by the 
resistant S. aureus strain.  
¶
 
We assume that antibiotics can be administered intravenously, but this is not a viable route because of health system 
constrains during epidemics. The sensitivity range is in terms of total capacity to intravenously treat the secondary infections 
with the resistant S. aureus strain instead of percent covered; the percent covered is then calculated depending on the size of the 
pandemic.  
 262 
We assumed the novel oral antibiotic can effectively treat the resistant infections and 263 
alleviate the burden on the health system. However, S. aureus has been quick to develop 264 
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resistance to novel antibiotics historically (Chambers & DeLeo, Frank R., 2009; Grundmann, 265 
Aires-de-Sousa, Boyce, & Tiemersma, 2006). In the base-case, we assumed that when in use, 266 
the antibiotic effectiveness treating infections caused by the resistant S. aureus strain decayed 267 
at the annual rate (r) 0.02 (Table 2). This means that 10 years after the antibiotic’s 268 
introduction and wide use it would no longer treat 18% of infections effectively (see 269 
Appendix B for comparison with the speed S. aureus developed resistance historically).  270 
 271 
3.2. Costs 272 
We considered the costs of developing ( I ) and stockpiling ( SC ) the novel antibiotic, 273 
including the cost of wastage, misdiagnosis, and empirical treatment that is likely due to the 274 
volume of patients. We ignored the costs of distributing antibiotics ( RC ) during the 275 
pandemic, which are small compared to potential burden averted by the novel antibiotic (see 276 
3.3 Benefits) and are incurred in both Policy A and Policy B. Future costs were discounted at 277 
3.5%. Table 2 provides the costs and benefits (further explained in Appendix B). 278 
 279 
Table 2. Costs and benefits 280 
 Base-case Sensitivity range† Source for assumptions 
Antibiotic 
Out-of-pocket cost of 
developing an 
antibiotic ( I ) 
$1.1 
billion 
 
(Sertkaya et al., 2014; 
DiMasi, Grabowski, & 
Hansen, 2016) 
Stockpile size  1 million 
Lognormal 
(0.2, 1, 5 million) 
(Siddiqui & Edmunds, 
2008; Lugnér & Postma, 
2009) 
Stockpile storage cost 
per course per year  
$1 
Truncated normal 
($0.20, $1.00, $1.90)  
Population level 
effectiveness rate 
of decay when in 
use ( r ) 
0.02 
Lognormal 
(0.004, 0.015, 0.050) 
(Grundmann et al., 2006 
and herin; Chambers & 
DeLeo, Frank R., 2009) 
Disease Burden costs ‡ 
Value of statistical 
life 
$2.4 
million 
Truncated normal 
($1.8, $2.4, $3.0 million) 
(Department for Transport, 
2017) 
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Cost of 
hospitalization per 
patient 
$5,000 
Truncated normal 
($2, $5, $8 thousand) 
(Lode, 2007; NICE, 2014; 
Rozenbaum, Mangen, 
Huijts, van der Werf, & 
Postma, 2015) 
Economic benefits 
a § 0, 27  
Fit based on (Smith, 
Keogh-Brown, Barnett, & 
Tait, 2009; Keogh-Brown, 
Smith, Edmunds, & 
Beutels, 2010) 
u § 0, 0.30  
Fit based on (Smith et al., 
2009; Keogh-Brown et al., 
2010) 
Averted burden when there is no pandemic (annual)   
Hospital days 300,000 
Truncated normal 
(200, 300, 400 thousand) 
Authors’ assumption 
Other 
Discount rate 3.5%   
Costs are in US$ 2015.  
† Distribution used in Latin-Hypercube Sampling Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient sensitivity analysis. 
Percentiles the distribution was fitted to are provided in parentheses: 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5%. 
‡ Disease burden costs are represented as benefits—from averted burden by the novel antibiotic—in the 
model. 
§ Shape parameter in function of percent Gross Domestic Product loss in terms of mortality (see the 
Appendix). We evaluate each scenario without economic losses averted (i.e., a and u are both 0) and with 
economic losses averted.
 
  281 
3.3. Benefits 282 
We estimated the benefits before ( PPB ), during ( PB ), and after the pandemic ( APB ) based on 283 
the avertable burden by the novel antibiotic, including hospitalization, deaths, and economic 284 
losses. Prior to pandemic influenza, the healthcare system would not be overburdened and 285 
individuals could be treated intravenously in healthcare facilities. However, the novel oral 286 
antibiotic would reduce the length of stay in hospitals and prevent hospitalization, averting 287 
hospital days and associated costs in Policy B (Table 2).  288 
 289 
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The avertable burden during the pandemic depends on the number of secondary infections 290 
caused by the resistant S. aureus strain (Table 1). We assumed that the novel oral antibiotic 291 
would not be more effective treating infections caused by the resistant strain than IV 292 
administered antibiotics, and therefore the oral antibiotic would not avert additional deaths 293 
among patients that could alternatively be treated by IV therapy. However, the availability of 294 
oral therapy would reduce their hospitalization. Among patients that the health system would 295 
not have had the capacity to treat with IV administered antibiotics, the oral antibiotic would 296 
avert both hospitalizations and deaths. We conservatively assumed the oral antibiotic does 297 
not avert losses to the economy in the base-case scenario, but we do consider potential impact 298 
on economic losses in the sensitivity analysis. 299 
 300 
The benefits decayed according to r when policy dictated the oral antibiotic’s wide use. 301 
Benefits were further discounted at 3.5%. 302 
 303 
3.4. Sensitivity analysis 304 
Alternative scenarios were constructed to explore influenza pandemics of differing magnitude 305 
(Table 1). We set the hazard rate for the mild scenario at 3/100 per year and for the severe 306 
scenario at 1/300 per year. We did not consider low capacity to treat (20% of patients) with 307 
IV administered antibiotics in the mild pandemic scenario, and we did not consider high 308 
capacity to treat (80% of patients) in the severe scenario; scenarios which seemed 309 
unreasonable. 310 
 311 
We also estimated the option value accounting for economic losses averted in addition to 312 
hospitalizations and deaths averted. Based on a general equilibrium model of influenza 313 
pandemic in the UK, we assumed an S-shaped curve representing percent Gross Domestic 314 
Product (GDP) loss in terms of the mortality rate—a high number of deaths during the 315 
pandemic triggers absenteeism from work, which drives economy losses (Smith et al., 2009) 316 
(see Appendix B and C for details). 317 
 318 
Lastly, we explored the relative sensitivity of the option value model to parameters using 319 
Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) and conducting a Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient 320 
(PRCC) analysis. The sampling distributions are provided in Table 1 and in Table 2. 321 
Parameters with large absolute PRCC values that are statistically significant (t-test) are most 322 
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influential (See Appendix B for more detail). We further explored the most important 323 
parameters and examined how they impact the option value threshold for the influenza 324 
pandemic application. 325 
 326 
4. Application results 327 
4.1. Base-case 328 
In the base-case pandemic scenario approximately 455,000 individuals developed secondary 329 
bacterial infections with the S. aureus strain resistant to all oral options but the novel 330 
antibiotic. The strain caused approximately 68,000 deaths when we assumed the healthcare 331 
system had the capacity to intravenously treat 50% of patients infected with it (30% of all 332 
pandemic related deaths). The strain caused 27,000 deaths if capacity was set to 80% and 333 
109,500 deaths if it was 20%. 334 
 335 
Figure 3 shows the option value for different scenarios. When IV therapy capacity during the 336 
pandemic was set to 50% or 20%, withholding wide use proved to be fruitful, providing a 337 
value of $578 million and $2.2 billion respectively. However, introducing the novel antibiotic 338 
prior to identifying the pandemic would have been the better strategy if 80% of patients 339 
infected with the strain could not be treated intravenously. The value of waiting until the 340 
pandemic was identified was -$1.1 billion in this case. 341 
 342 
4.2. Alternative scenarios 343 
If the pandemic proved to be mild, withholding the novel antibiotic prior to the pandemic was 344 
not beneficial (Figure 3), even though the hazard rate for this scenario was significantly 345 
higher. In the mild pandemic scenario 6,500 individuals died, and the resistant S. aureus 346 
strain was responsible for either 800 (80% coverage) or 2,000 deaths (50% coverage), 347 
depending on IV therapy coverage. The option value was approximately -$1.3 billion for both 348 
IV therapy coverage levels.  349 
 350 
Withholding wide use of the novel antibiotic until the severe pandemic scenario provided 351 
significant value despite the low hazard rate. In this scenario, the pandemic CFR was set to 352 
2.5% and deaths caused by infections with the resistant S. aureus strain represented 36% 353 
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(57.5%) of these deaths when IV therapy covered 50% (20%) of patients. The option value 354 
was $2.1 billion ($4.7 billion) when IV therapy covered 50% (20%) of patients. 355 
 356 
 357 
Figure 3. Value of withholding a novel oral antibiotic until pandemic influenza is identified.  358 
 359 
4.3. Economic losses 360 
The option value was higher if we considered economic losses. In the mild pandemic 361 
scenario, benefits due to economic losses averted were insignificant, and withholding wide 362 
use until the pandemic remained unattractive. Withholding wide use until the base-case 363 
pandemic also remained unattractive if 80% of patients could be treated by IV therapy. 364 
However, the value increased by 141% (57%) when IV coverage was 50% (20%). In the 365 
severe scenario the value increased by 73% (50%) when IV coverage was 50% (20%). 366 
 367 
4.4. Model sensitivity to parameters 368 
Table 3 shows the results from the PRCC sensitivity analysis. As expected,  369 
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a higher pandemic hazard rate (PRCC = 0.581, p<0.0001), a larger pandemic (PRCC = 0.279, 370 
p<0.0001), and a higher antibiotic decay rate (PRCC = 0.578, p<0.0001) increased the value 371 
of withholding wide use of the novel antibiotic. The most important parameter influencing 372 
potential benefits during the pandemic was the portion of secondary bacterial infections 373 
caused by the resistant strain (PRCC = 0.790, p<0.0001). The most influential parameter 374 
negatively correlated with the option value was the cost of hospitalization (PRCC = -0.622, 375 
p<0.0001). A longer pandemic duration (PRCC = -0.305, p<0.0001) reduced the value due to 376 
resistance spreading and due to discounting further into the future; we did not consider the 377 
shock impact of a high number of deaths over a short duration, which likely would have 378 
increased the negative impact of the pandemic duration hazard rate.  379 
 380 
Table 3. Partial rank correlation coefficient (PRCC) sensitivity analysis 381 
Parameter PRCC p-value 
Antibiotic stockpiling costs 0.000 0.94337 
Hospitalization costs -0.622 0.00000 
Value of statistical life 0.052 0.00000 
Hospital days averted during non-pandemic period -0.409 0.00000 
Pandemic hazard rate 0.581 0.00000 
Pandemic period hazard rate (1/mean duration) -0.305 0.00000 
Pandemic attack rate 0.279 0.00000 
Pandemic case fatality rate (not including deaths caused by resistant S. 
aureus strain) 
0.071 0.0000 
Percent develop secondary 0.260 0.00000 
Portion of bacterial infections that are S. aureus strain resistant to existing 
oral antibiotics 
0.790 0.00000 
Secondary infections with resistant S. aureus strain case fatality rate 0.116 0.00000 
Capacity to treat intravenously -0.199 0.00000 
Antibiotic decay rate 0.578 0.00000 
100,000 Latin Hypercube samples were drawn. Parameter distributions are presented in Table 1 and 2. 
 382 
4.5. Option value thresholds 383 
In this section we vary the most influential parameters to determine under what conditions 384 
Policy A, the option to withhold wide use of the novel antibiotic, is beneficial. We then also 385 
use equation (10) to consider the maximum ratio of benefits pre-pandemic to post-pandemic 386 
for Policy A to be beneficial. 387 
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 388 
Figure 4 plots the impact of the pandemic—captured by varying the percent of secondary 389 
bacterial infections that are caused by the resistant S. aureus strain—against other influential 390 
parameters. In each panel, all other parameters were set to the base-case without economic 391 
losses averted and IV therapy coverage at 50%. When we set the hazard rate (Panel A) to 392 
3/100 per year, the cut-off point at which withholding the antibiotic was beneficial (the value 393 
of waiting = 0) was when the resistant strain caused approximately 2% of secondary 394 
infections and 14,000 avertable deaths. For hazard rates 1/100, 1/300, or 1/500 per year, the 395 
corresponding cut-off points were approximately 4.5%, 11.7%, or 18.0% of secondary 396 
infections.  397 
 398 
When we set the novel antibiotic annual rate of decay (Panel B) to 0.02, the cut-off point was 399 
approximately 6.3% of secondary infections caused by the resistant strain (~43,000 avertable 400 
deaths). The lowest rate of decay for which withholding the antibiotic was beneficial was 401 
0.0067, and it was only beneficial when more than 19.7% of secondary infections were 402 
caused by the resistant bacteria (~134,000 avertable deaths).  403 
 404 
When we set the cost of hospitalization (Panel C) to below $2,000, the resistant strain had to 405 
cause more than 2.3% of secondary infections for Policy A to be beneficial. When we set the 406 
cost to $5,000 or $10,000 the cut-off point was 5% and 12.7% of secondary infections 407 
respectively. If 100,000 hospital days were averted (Panel D) in the year the antibiotic was 408 
first introduced during the pre-pandemic period (and slightly less each following year as the 409 
antibiotic decayed), the cut-off point would be 2% of secondary infections, and if it was 410 
300,000 or 500,000 hospital days averted, the cut-off points would be 6.3% (~43,000 411 
avertable deaths) and 10.7% (~73,000 avertable deaths) respectively.   412 
 413 
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 414 
Figure 4. Sensitivity of the option value model to influential parameters.  415 
 416 
Finally, we use the base-case values of parameters on the right-hand side of inequality (10) to 417 
calculate the threshold  418 
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 420 
Our base-case values indicate withholding wide use of the antibiotic will be a preferred 421 
strategy if the annual benefits during the pandemic are at least 1000 times greater than the 422 
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annual pre-pandemic benefits. In the mild and severe pandemic scenarios, the annual benefits 423 
during the pandemic would need to be at least 380 and 3,000 times greater than the pre-424 
pandemic ones respectively. 425 
 426 
4.6. Discussion 427 
The literature assessing the value and cost-effectiveness of antibiotics assumes introducing 428 
antibiotics is a now-or-never decision (e.g., Sertkaya et al., 2014) despite the inherent value 429 
of the option to delay antibiotics’ use to slow down emergence and spread of resistance. We 430 
developed a model based on real options theory to estimate the value of delaying antibiotic 431 
introduction. The closest work to our model is by Attema et al. (2010), who use a real options 432 
framework to value investment in stockpiling an antiviral drug for an influenza pandemic 433 
with uncertain timing. In their model, the economic value derives from the option to delay 434 
investing in their stockpile, but we additionally value delaying the spread of resistance to our 435 
treatment. The effectiveness of the precautionary measure (i.e., the stockpile) is endogenous 436 
in our model. Attema et al. assume uncertainty follows a Brownian motion. Our goal was to 437 
provide a closed-form solution that can be simply calculated for different antibiotics and 438 
indications without requiring simulation. Incorporating antimicrobial resistance in our model 439 
introduced additional complexity that prevented us from arriving at a close-form solution, 440 
and therefore we assumed exponentially distributed uncertainty. We derived a theoretical 441 
condition under which withholding wide use of the antibiotic would be a preferred option 442 
from a benefit-cost perspective as compared to using the antibiotic immediately. We 443 
empirically quantified the threshold value for the condition to withhold, and we estimated the 444 
option value for stockpiling and withholding wide use of a novel oral antibiotic until 445 
detecting an influenza pandemic that potentially overwhelms the healthcare system in the 446 
UK. 447 
 448 
Pandemic influenza preparedness provides a clear example of when conserving antibiotic 449 
effectiveness for a specific indication provides value to society. If the background prevalence 450 
of resistant bacterial strains—mostly carried asymptomatically in the community—is high, 451 
pandemic influenza can lead to a wave of secondary infections with few treatment options. 452 
Even if prevalence in the community is not high, transmission of resistant strains in 453 
healthcare facilities that are accommodating an influx of patients can be high, similarly 454 
leading to resistant secondary infections. The acute pressure on the healthcare system could 455 
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overwhelm providers to the point they cannot sufficiently treat all patients during the peak of 456 
the pandemic, even if IV antibiotic therapy exists. Without an effective option to quell rising 457 
demand for an orally-administered antibiotic in primary care services, a high number of cases 458 
and deaths and knock-on effects on the economy caused by absenteeism could be devastating. 459 
Interventions that mitigate these outcomes will undoubtedly hold value. The health 460 
economics literature found pharmaceutical interventions such as vaccines and antivirals and 461 
non-pharmaceutical interventions such as school-closures cost-effective in many 462 
circumstances (Velasco et al., 2012). Effective antibiotics are unlikely to reduce the number 463 
of cases in an influenza pandemic, but they are likely to reduce severe illness and deaths, and 464 
therefore, potentially absenteeism (Chien et al., 2012).  465 
 466 
We found that protecting our hypothetical oral antibiotic until detecting pandemic influenza 467 
can provide significant value. However, if the pandemic is mild or if the prevalence of the 468 
resistant pathogen is non-existent, the population would be better off either using the 469 
antibiotic earlier or continuing to wait until a more significant event occurs. We assumed a 470 
prevalent S. aureus strain resistant to all oral options except for the hypothetical drug. A few 471 
novel agents for treating methicillin-resistant S. aureus were approved in the last decade, 472 
including linezolid, which can be administered orally, and additional investigational agents 473 
are in the pipeline (Rodvold & McConeghy, 2014). Our hypothetical antibiotic can represent 474 
one of these drugs, but since experience has taught us that S. aureus quickly develops 475 
resistance to novel agents, our model may also be used as a decision tool, whether to invest in 476 
a new drug.  477 
 478 
If we wait until no options are available before deciding to invest in novel drugs, we may be 479 
too late. Having effective antibiotics is critical for preventing outbreaks in healthcare settings 480 
forcing shutting down wards and for reducing the impact and costs of disastrous events such 481 
as significant influenza pandemics (Brundage, 2006), food-borne infection outbreaks (Newell 482 
et al., 2010), or natural disasters (Ligon, 2006). These events are unpredictable, and it is 483 
unlikely that scientists and pharmaceuticals will have sufficient time to develop new effective 484 
drugs when they strike. 485 
 486 
Ignoring the opportunity cost to delay the introduction of novel antibiotics and conserve their 487 
effectiveness will narrow investments in antibiotics to ones that provide immediate value and 488 
will presuppose a strategy of immediate wide use, and this will leave the population 489 
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unprepared. When the risks for significant events that will require effective antibiotics are 490 
sufficiently low, we may be better off not investing in a new drug when other options are 491 
available, but ignoring the benefits of the option to delay increases the likelihood that we will 492 
not be prepared even if the risks are sufficiently high.  493 
 494 
Decisions on investment in antibiotics need to consider both immediate values and the value 495 
to delay. Immediately introducing an approved agent will be the optimal choice in many 496 
cases. For example: agents that treat infections with a high burden and limited treatment 497 
options; agents that add significant value by increasing the diversity of an existing portfolio 498 
and slowing resistance spread; and agents that provide significant value enabling other 499 
medical procedures, including surgery and chemotherapy.  500 
 501 
Our model is a simplification. We only consider one significant event (i.e., one pandemic 502 
influenza) occurring, we do not consider transmission dynamics, and we assume that 503 
resistance to the novel antibiotic increases at a constant rate when it is widely used. These 504 
assumptions can be relaxed in future models and simulations. Furthermore, a positive value 505 
in our model does not imply private firms have incentive to invest in antibiotic development. 506 
Providing a rational for this would require a broader regulatory and risk sharing framework, 507 
and this is an area for future work. We apply our model to a pandemic influenza scenario 508 
leading to secondary bacterial infections; however, reparametrizing the model it can be 509 
applied to other outbreaks. 510 
 511 
The results we present in our worked example suggest that considering the option value of 512 
delaying introducing antibiotics is important for making decisions to invest in antibiotics. 513 
Governments globally will need to consider this value as we move to new business models 514 
for encouraging antibiotics research and development (R&D) and promoting stewardship; 515 
experts globally are pushing for a delinked model for antibiotics, in which healthcare systems 516 
pay a flat annual fee instead of pharmaceutical revenues relying on volume of sales (Towse et 517 
al., 2017; Department of Health, 2017). This provides the healthcare system the opportunity 518 
to devise strategies for antibiotics use. For certain antibiotics it may be obvious that 519 
introducing the antibiotic today will be optimal, but in other cases comparing the values an 520 
antibiotic provides can guide investment in novel agents as well as strategies on how to use 521 
them. 522 
523 
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Figure Legends 746 
 747 
Figure 1. Policy A. The antibiotic is available at t0, but is held off until the outbreak is 748 
detected. 749 
 750 
Figure 2. Policy B. The antibiotic is available at t0 and is widely introduced immediately. 751 
 752 
Figure 3. Value of withholding a novel oral antibiotic until pandemic influenza is 753 
identified. The values without economic losses include deaths and hospitalizations averted. 754 
Economic losses are based on an S-shaped curve relating percent GDP loss to mortality, 755 
which triggers higher rates of absenteeism. We consider different levels of capacity for the 756 
healthcare system treating patients intravenously: 20%, 50%, and 80% in the base-case, 50% 757 
and 80% when the pandemic scenario is mild, and 20% and 50% when it is severe. 758 
Parameters for the base-case, mild, and severe scenarios are provided in Table 1 and Table 2. 759 
 760 
Figure 4. Sensitivity of the option value to influential parameters. The x-axis is the 761 
percent of secondary infections caused by the resistant S. aureus strain; the approximate 762 
number of avertable deaths by an effective oral antibiotic are in parentheses. The y-axes are 763 
A) the annual hazard rate of the base-case pandemic influenza scenario, B) the novel 764 
antibiotic annual rate of decay when the antibiotic is widely used, C) the cost of 765 
hospitalization, and D) the number of hospital days averted annually when the antibiotic is 766 
widely used during the non-pandemic period. In each panel, all other parameters are set to the 767 
base-case without economic losses averted (see Table 1 and Table 2). 768 
